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n the development of military professionals, the historical record is an invaluable 
resource for those who choose to study and reflect on the infinite variables that 
affect strategic planning� On January 28, 1944, Admiral Harry E� Yarnell ad-
dressed a meeting of the American Military Institute� In a speech entitled “The 
Utility of Military History” the admiral expressed how “[t]he value of military 
history to the student lies in the fact that when he is in possession of all the infor-
mation regarding a certain operation, he can evaluate the good and bad points of 
a campaign or operation, and, through the lessons learned, be more qualified as 
a leader to carry out actual operations in time of war�”1
Yarnell spoke from experience as a planner in two world wars and from the 
perspective of a career that uniquely equipped him to examine naval planning 
following those wars� Although forgotten and unheralded as a strategist and 
planner, Yarnell left writings that contain numerous lessons learned, or truisms, 
to which he adhered during his naval career� Several of these lessons revealed 
themselves during his planning experiences from 
1918 to 1920, molded in part by the academic 
training and intellectual refinement he received 
from studying at the Naval War College (NWC)� 
Yarnell’s lessons, reinforced during the interwar 
period, guided his thoughts on planning and in his 
postretirement work for the Office of the Chief of 
Naval Operations (OPNAV) during World War II�
I
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Yarnell’s naval career prior to World War I provided him with ex-
tensive Far East experience� After graduation from the U�S� Naval 
Academy in 1897, he served on board the battleship USS Oregon (BB 
3) and participated in its cruise from San Francisco around South 
America to Cuba during the Spanish-American War� After complet-
ing his final examinations and receiving his commission as an ensign, 
he returned to the Pacific and served on board a gunboat during the 
Philippine-American War in 1899 and with the China Relief Expedi-
tion during the Boxer Rebellion in 1900�2 In his next assignment, as 
an aide to Asiatic Fleet commander Rear Admiral George Remey, 
Yarnell worked alongside Fleet Intelligence Officer and Inspector of 
Target Practice Lieutenant William S� Sims—forming a relationship 
with the young maverick that would blossom in the years to come�3
Returning stateside in 1902, Yarnell served in and commanded torpedo boats 
and destroyers, with time aboard USS Biddle (TB 26), USS Dale (DD 4), USS 
Stockton (TB 32), and USS Barry (DD 2)� During his time aboard Barry, Yarnell 
returned to the Asiatic Fleet via the Suez Canal, at which point he took command 
of Dale in April 1904� Yarnell returned to the United States in April 1905 for over 
a year of shore duty at the Naval Proving Ground, Indian Head, Maryland, before 
joining the battleship USS Connecticut (BB 18) in September 1906 for its com-
missioning and around-the-world voyage with the Great White Fleet�
Prior to the grand cruise, however, the Navy tried Yarnell before a general 
court-martial for “culpable inefficiency in the performance of duty” and “neglect 
of duty” as officer of the deck when Connecticut ran aground near entering the 
harbor at Culebra, off Puerto Rico, on January 13, 1907� The court acquitted 
Yarnell of all charges�4
Upon the battleship’s return to the United States, Yarnell served a tour at the 
Naval Torpedo Station, Newport, Rhode Island, from 1909 to 1911, with follow-
on assignments first as fleet engineer for the Atlantic Fleet and then as navigator 
in the battleship USS New Jersey (BB 16), during which the ship participated in 
the 1914 Veracruz occupation�
In July 1914, then–lieutenant commander Yarnell received orders to attend 
the NWC long course� He presumably was pleased with this appointment, as 
he recently had published an article in the U�S� Naval Institute Proceedings em-
phasizing how practical experience at sea, together with applying fundamental 
principles of strategy and tactics, enabled greater efficiency within the fleet�5
Although he was already familiar with the writings of Rear Admiral Alfred 
Thayer Mahan and Carl von Clausewitz, the sixteen-month course introduced 
Yarnell to the “applicatory system” of instruction, which taught strategy and 
Admiral Harry E. Yarnell, USN, circa 
1944, while serving as head of the 
Special Planning Section under the 
Vice Chief of Naval Operations, 
Vice Admiral Frederick J. Horne.
Naval History and Heritage  
Command
2
Naval War College Review, Vol. 73 [2020], No. 1, Art. 7
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss1/7
 B L A Z I C H  1 0 9
command via war games� Adopted from the Army War College in 1911–12, 
this three-part system revolved around preparing an “estimate of the situation,” 
writing orders, and evaluating these orders via war games or staff rides� The 
“estimate of the situation” provided a logical approach that could be applied 
consistently to evaluate a military or naval problem and ascertain a course of 
action through a series of steps and decisions� A student needed to derive a clear 
mission statement; consider probable enemy strength and intentions; assess one’s 
own forces’ strength, capabilities, and disposition; evaluate the effectiveness of 
possible courses of action; and reach decisions regarding a final course of action� 
A student then would use his individual estimates as the foundation for drafting 
standardized-format orders that could be wargamed for evaluation�6
Yarnell benefited from his NWC experience� The College provided an officer 
with an environment “where ideas, facts, and logic were of greater importance 
than rank and name,” argues historian Gerald E� Wheeler�7 Studies of tactics, strat-
egy, policy, and logistics prepared Yarnell to produce strong, analytically sound 
estimates and to game his solutions, all while being guided to further derive and 
strengthen general principles from his studies and discussions among peers�8 Use 
of Clausewitz in the curriculum and the discussions most likely reinforced for 
Yarnell particular principles when developing strategic plans—namely, the coor-
dination between military leadership and civilian policy makers, drawing from 
the Prussian general’s maxim: “War is merely the continuation of policy by other 
means�”9 After graduation, Yarnell stayed on the NWC staff under the presidency 
of Rear Admiral Austin M� Knight, a reformer akin to Sims in many respects, 
and one whose views, notably on a unified military department, Yarnell shared�10
For his follow-on assignment, Yarnell returned to sea as commanding officer 
of the gunboat USS Nashville (PG 7)� Following American entry into World War 
I in April 1917, Nashville in August received orders to steam to Gibraltar to join 
other Allied warships patrolling the waters for enemy submarines� That October, 
Yarnell went ashore after receiving orders assigning him as temporary American 
base commander at Gibraltar, and on November 25, 1917, he assumed additional 
duties as chief of staff to Rear Admiral Albert P� Niblack, Commander, Squadron 
2, Patrol Force, Atlantic Fleet�11
Concurrently in London, now–vice admiral Sims, in his role as Commander, 
U�S� Naval Forces Operating in European Waters, was steadily building up his 
forces to support the Allied war effort� For several months, Sims maintained a 
robust correspondence with Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Wil-
liam S� Benson requesting additional personnel for his headquarters to develop 
a planning section to coordinate with the British Admiralty� Collectively, the 
Allied planners would develop plans for aggressive operations against the Im-
perial German Navy, such as the April 1918 British raid on the Belgian port of 
3
Blazich: Neptune’s Oracle: Admiral Harry E. Yarnell’s Wartime Planning, 19
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020
 1 1 0  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
Bruges-Zeebrugge� Sims suggested a staff composed of War College–educated, 
up-and-coming younger officers—and the list included Yarnell�12 In November 
1917, Sims at last received Benson’s approval to establish a planning section 
composed of three War College graduates: Commander Dudley W� Knox, Cap-
tain Frank H� Schofield, and a third man to be named later—Yarnell�13 A fourth 
section member, Colonel Robert H� Dunlap, USMC, arrived in March 1918�14
In December 1917, Knox, Schofield, and Yarnell established the American Na-
val Planning Section London� Free of administrative duties, the officers devoted 
all their time to surveying operations, discovering mistakes, suggesting improve-
ments, and preparing plans for future operations� Essentially they were delivering 
to the force commander a “continuous Estimate of the Situation”—a method that 
Admiral Chester W� Nimitz employed decades later, albeit labeled a “Running 
Summary of [the] Situation�”15 The memorandums they produced mirrored the 
War College methodology� Yarnell participated in the drafting of forty-seven of 
the seventy-one London Planning Section memorandums, all developed in close 
consultation with Knox and Schofield�16
Working under Sims and with his fellow planners, Yarnell refined some of his 
own ideas and advanced an understanding of the need for harmonization among 
Vice Admiral William S. Sims with members of his staff, circa mid-1918. Seated in the second row are, from left to right, Captain Dudley W. Knox; Captain 
Frank H. Schofield; Captain Nathan C. Twining; Sims; and Captain Harry E. Yarnell.
Naval History and Heritage Command
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instruments of power� Principally, this meant coordination between political and 
military leaderships in developing both national and Allied strategy, as well as 
plans touching on information�17 Combined with his work at the Naval War Col-
lege, Yarnell’s Planning Section experience “solidified his unification thinking,” 
writes historian Jeffery M� Dorwart� Yarnell believed that a merger of the Navy 
and War Departments would result in greater cooperation and better coordina-
tion among forces, in the interest of efficiency and economy of effort�18 Yarnell 
drew on the intellectual and informational resources of the Admiralty and from 
Italian and French naval planners to help guide his thinking�
Although the Planning Section work produced intellectually rigorous results, 
these did not always translate into success at sea, notably in the Adriatic�19 The 
planners’ work, however, did provide Sims and OPNAV with various courses of 
action when considering how to prosecute the war effort better�20
The London Planning Section caught Washington’s attention, and by sum-
mer 1918 OPNAV increasingly depended on the London team for its own 
planning�21 In mid-July 1918, Benson cabled Sims of his desire to continue this 
work in Washington and ordered Sims to transfer Yarnell to OPNAV, sending 
Captain Luke McNamee to London in exchange�22 The CNO also requested that 
the London Planning Section prepare an outline of a plans organization based 
on recommendations from the war experience, the resulting memorandum for 
which accompanied Yarnell to Washington�23 Reporting to OPNAV in Septem-
ber, Yarnell served in the Planning Section under Rear Admiral James H� Oliver� 
Yarnell also received verbal instructions from 
Benson to sit on the Joint Army and Navy Plan-
ning Committee, which had been organized to 
“investigate, study, and report upon questions 
relative to the national defense and involving 
joint action of the Army and Navy�”24 Almost a 
full year later, in August 1919, two more officers, 
Captain William S� Pye and Lieutenant Com-
mander Holloway H� Frost, joined the Planning 
Section� Together with the existing section, these 
men formed the OPNAV Planning (or Plans) 
Division; Yarnell described them as “capable 
youngsters with War College training and full of 
vim and vigor�”25 By 1922, the group became the 
War Plans Division, exclusively focused on plan-
ning for a range of war scenarios�26
Yarnell’s work within the division from Sep-
tember 1918 to September 1920 drew heavily 
Captain Harry E. Yarnell, circa 1918, as a member of Vice Admiral 
Sims’s American Naval Planning Section London.
Naval History and Heritage Command
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from his experience in London� Rather than drafting memorandums concerning 
estimates of situations, Yarnell now focused on plans� For his first year, the plan-
ning was “usually administrative planning” on “comparatively minor subjects,” 
such as liaison work with the State Department, the study of international law, 
South and Central American policies and operations, and insular policy�27 But the 
time in London for Yarnell and his fellow Planning Section alumni, in the words 
of historian David F� Trask, “enlarged the horizons of naval expansionist thought,” 
notably through recognition of the increasing naval and diplomatic power and 
influence of the United States� Planning for future conflicts would center on the 
two most able naval powers, Great Britain and Japan�28
Regarding those two powers, Yarnell gravitated toward a focus on the Pacific� 
His initial work with the division raised fundamental questions that were used to 
guide the overall planning process� With Germany defeated and with the United 
States lacking a stated enemy or a plan to confront one, Yarnell deemed the situa-
tion “like trying to design a machine tool without knowing whether the operator 
is going to manufacture hair pins or locomotives�” Two potent navies—those of 
Great Britain and Japan—challenged that of the United States, and in the im-
mediate postwar period both countries were considered likely enemies owing 
to their alliance�29 But in a March 29, 1919, memorandum to acting CNO Rear 
Admiral Josiah S� McKean, Yarnell concluded, “It is apparent that our most prob-
able enemy at the present time is Japan�”30 On August 12, 1919—the CNO’s last 
working day in office and the day after the Planning Division stood up—Admiral 
Benson approved Yarnell’s “Basic Plan of Procedure for the Pacific�” Yarnell 
refined his thinking later in September with his paper entitled “Strategy in the 
Pacific,” which the General Staff College and the Naval War College reprinted�31
When the Joint Board met in October to discuss War Plan ORANGE, the U�S� 
strategic plan to defeat Japan, Yarnell raised additional questions about the basics 
of planning—notably, what the interests and policy of the nation were for the 
Far East� These and other queries, Yarnell concluded, required State Depart-
ment input� This marked Yarnell’s growing conviction of the necessity for in-
creased liaison among the different elements of national power, in this instance 
State Department diplomats and officers of the Navy and War Departments�32 
Considering the emphasis today on coordinating instruments of power— 
diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law 
enforcement—Yarnell in 1920 demonstrated a perceptive grasp of the ways and 
means involved in deriving and carrying out a strategy�33
Upon his detachment from the division, Yarnell drafted a memorandum of 
his own ideas, based on his planning experiences� He emphasized that Navy 
activities must rest on basic war plans, and that from these should flow a series 
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of plans for building programs, base projects, fleet organization, and personnel� 
For the War Plans Division itself, Yarnell stressed that it should be staffed with 
high-quality, War College–educated members, low in number but with good in-
ternal communication� Addressing the division’s current efforts, he emphasized 
consideration of economic efficiency in planning: “It is probably a safe statement 
to make that our naval efficiency would be doubled if every dollar was spent with 
that end in view, and only after the purpose for which spent had been referred 
to the war plans�” He concluded that the Plans Division’s future, “by hard steady 
work, all based on sound principles, and sound general plans,” was assured�34
Yarnell’s World War I planning experience produced an array of ideas and 
potential policy actions because it occurred within an intellectual environment 
of gifted NWC graduates� He benefited from ample opportunities to garner feed-
back from his work, from both uniformed American counterparts and Allied 
military personnel� Through his thinking on the virtues of unification, whether 
of forces or toward strategic alignment, Yarnell always sought to understand 
national policy and interests as the basis for planning a military strategy� A core 
tenet of efficiency underlined Yarnell’s planning, aiming to save resources, re-
gardless of whom or what they represented�
INTERWAR EXPERIENCES AND RENEWED CONFLICT
The period stretching from Yarnell’s work in OPNAV to his retirement in the fall 
of 1939 found him prominently engaged in the growing naval aviation commu-
nity� He commanded Naval Air Station Hampton Roads and the Aircraft Squad-
rons, Scouting Fleet from 1924 to 1926, followed by another staff assignment to 
the Naval War College in 1926–27� In July 1927, he reported to Naval Air Station 
Pensacola for flight instruction and received a naval aviation observer designa-
tion� In September 1927, Yarnell arrived in Camden, New Jersey, to oversee the 
fitting out and commissioning of the carrier USS Saratoga (CV 3) and served 
briefly as its first commanding officer�35
In September 1928, Yarnell achieved flag rank when he became chief of the 
Bureau of Engineering as a rear admiral� During his tenure he obtained German 
diesel engine technology to accelerate research and development in submarine 
engine propulsion�36 In the first quarter of 1930, he served additional duty as a 
naval adviser at the London Naval Conference, where his planning experience 
and technical knowledge supported Secretary of the Navy Charles F� Adams dur-
ing the negotiations�37
Throughout the 1930s, Yarnell’s most prominent roles involved naval aviation 
exercises and senior command in the Far East� As Commander, Aircraft Squad-
rons, Battle Force from 1931 to 1933, Yarnell’s carrier force of USS Lexington 
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(CV 2) and Saratoga participated in Grand Joint Army-Navy Exercise No� 4 and 
achieved notable distinction by conducting a surprise carrier raid on Army in-
stallations on Oahu—providing a foretaste of Japanese actions nine years later� In 
the follow-on, Navy-only Fleet Problem XIII, which examined challenges posed 
in conducting offensive operations against central Pacific Japanese League of 
Nations mandates, Yarnell concluded that the Navy needed additional carriers to 
ensure success in a future Pacific war�38
As Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet from 1936 to 1939, Yarnell garnered in-
ternational praise for his deft handling of challenges to American interests amid 
the outbreak of war between Japan and China� Having observed the fighting in 
and around Shanghai, Yarnell merged his ideas on naval aviation and Japanese 
interests with his old planning emphasis on unification and economy of force� In 
a letter of October 15, 1937, to CNO Admiral William D� Leahy, Yarnell sought 
to avoid the waste of World War I by advocating an economic and economical 
war, in particular a war “of strangulation, in short, an almost purely naval war in 
the Pacific as far as we are concerned.” A naval war of strangulation would entail 
using submarines, aircraft, and light forces with cruising endurance, economi-
cally employed, executing plans prepared in cooperation with the State, War, 
Rear Admiral Harry E. Yarnell, Commander, Aircraft Squadrons, Battle Force, inspecting the crew of his flagship, USS Saratoga (CV 3), in Lahaina Roadstead, 
Hawaii, February 17, 1932.
Naval History and Heritage Command
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and Navy Departments�39 Leahy shared Yarnell’s letter with President Franklin 
D� Roosevelt, who liked Yarnell’s approach, since it aligned with Roosevelt’s own 
thinking on confronting Japanese aggression�40
These ideas were not new� Back on February 13, 1919, Yarnell had submitted 
a memorandum to CNO Benson about a campaign against Japan� It detailed 
American actions that would be essential in the event of a war against Japan, 
including moving the fleet to Honolulu, building ships capable of fighting across 
the Pacific, and attacking Japanese commerce� “The war on commerce will be a 
preponderating feature,” Yarnell wrote, “the one method by which we can defeat 
Japan[,] as she depends on food imports�”41 In a November 25, 1938, letter, Yarnell 
suggested to Leahy that the United States halt financial loans and shipments 
of war materials to Japan, while increasing American submarine, aviation, and 
cruiser forces to threaten Japanese supply lines�42 This letter included a study 
entitled “Situation in the Pacific�” Historian Michael Vlahos notes the near-
verbatim similarity of Yarnell’s perspective regarding the Japanese in both the 
1938 study and the May 1918 Memorandum No� 21, “U�S� Naval Building Policy,” 
which Yarnell had helped to write for Sims’s London Planning Section�43 Yarnell’s 
recommendations—together with the Report of the Board to Investigate and 
Admiral Harry E. Yarnell, Commander, U.S. Asiatic Fleet, (bottom row, center) with his staff, aboard his flagship, USS Augusta (CA 31), circa winter 1937.
Naval History and Heritage Command
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Report upon the Need, for Purposes of National Defense, and for the Establish-
ment of Additional Submarine, Destroyer, Mine, and Naval Air Bases on the 
Coasts of the United States, Its Territories and Possessions, led by Rear Admiral 
Arthur J� Hepburn—historian Jeffery Underwood contends, merged with Roo-
sevelt’s to shape the president’s Far Eastern foreign policy of deterrence toward 
Japan�44
In July 1939, Admiral Thomas C� Hart relieved Yarnell as commander of the 
Asiatic Fleet and Yarnell returned to the United States to be retired from active 
naval service�45 Upon arrival in Washington in late August, he met with a variety 
of senior State, Navy, and War Department officials to discuss matters in the Far 
East�46 In a memorandum to CNO Admiral Harold R� Stark, written on Septem-
ber 2, Yarnell reiterated his 1938 positions on planning for a Pacific war� Specific 
points included engaging in a naval war of “cruisers, submarines, and aircraft 
operating against lines of communication” and avoiding fighting the Japanese 
alone (i�e�, without Allied support)�47 In early October 1940, following the Japa-
nese occupation of French Indochina, Yarnell met with Secretary of the Navy 
Frank Knox and recommended strengthening the Asiatic Fleet with aircraft, 
submarines, and cruisers�48 Writing to Stark after meeting with Knox, Yarnell 
offered his services to the Navy as a commander of escort or auxiliary vessels, 
recalling similar services that retired British admirals had performed during the 
First World War—an offer Stark politely declined�49
Yet while the Navy may not have been interested in Yarnell serving at sea, it 
was interested in his intellectual insights� On January 3, 1941, Yarnell reported for 
duty to Secretary Knox, who had decided to make use of his services as a general 
adviser, among other duties, until April, with follow-on assignments pertaining 
to industrial incentives, shipyard inspections, and awards boards� None of these 
leveraged Yarnell’s planning expertise or Far East experience but rather his Bu-
reau of Engineering experience and analytic abilities�50 In his advising capabili-
ties, Yarnell quickly drafted several brief memos to Knox, including one harping 
on the subject of wasted defense spending owing to the lack of a basic plan for 
national defense�51
On January 15, 1941, Yarnell submitted to Knox a memorandum entitled “Far 
Eastern Situation�” The memorandum arrived at an interesting moment: on the 
eve of the first “ABC” conference among U�S�, British, and Canadian military 
staffs� Yarnell articulated to Knox Japan’s desire to avoid war with the United 
States if it could achieve its goals without conflict, for “[t]he cooler heads of Japan 
realize that war with the United States is almost tantamount to national suicide�” 
Since this dynamic shifted the strategic initiative to the United States, Yarnell 
endorsed coordinating and strengthening American and Allied air and naval 
forces in the Far East to blunt any Japanese movement farther south� Regarding 
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the Philippines, he advocated for strengthening air, antiair, and submarine forces 
in the Philippines as soon as possible—by taking these forces “at the expense of 
Panama and Hawaii, which are in no danger of attack until the situation in Eu-
rope is radically changed for the worse�”52 Yarnell presumably knew of discussions 
among the Americans, British, Dutch, Australians, and New Zealanders to form 
an alliance to blunt Japanese aggression, and may have drafted this memo to bol-
ster the argument and efforts of Hart and the Asiatic Fleet to funnel increased aid 
to the Pacific rather than Europe� In either case, a week after Yarnell submitted 
his memo to Knox, Hart received word that no reinforcements would be going 
to the Asiatic Fleet�53
In mid-January 1942, following American entry into World War II, Yarnell 
received orders assigning him as adviser to the Chinese military mission�54 In his 
own words, the mission was “interesting, but doesn’t do much to win the war”; he 
added, “I dislike a desk job, and I dislike Washington�”55 In August 1942, orders 
were cut to assign Yarnell to the General Board, but he spoke about the move 
to Knox, who promptly had these orders canceled�56 Instead, Yarnell requested 
sea duty at month’s end—“preferably in the Pacific”—but received from Knox a 
noncommittal response, stating that he would be ordered to sea duty “when and 
if a suitable billet is available�”57 So when the Chinese delegation was recalled in 
January 1943, Yarnell requested to be returned to the retired list�58 But he would 
make one last request for a sea assignment; on May 15, 1943, to Rear Admiral 
Randall Jacobs, chief of the Bureau of Personnel, Yarnell reiterated his October 
1940 appeal to Stark, seeking active duty as a convoy commodore� Jacobs politely 
declined on the basis of Yarnell’s age of almost sixty-eight�59
No sooner had the aged admiral returned to Newport in early 1943 than he 
received a request to go back to Washington to assist the Navy once again� In 
mid-February, Captain William D� Puleston—who himself had been retired but 
was serving in the Office of Economic Warfare Analysis—wrote to Yarnell and 
mentioned how Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Aviation Artemus L� Gates 
had expressed a desire for Yarnell to advise him on the future of naval aviation� 
Appealing to Yarnell, Puleston wrote, “If we get the correct plan for naval avia-
tion settled, it will point the way to the naval-military policy for the post-war�”60 
Yarnell evidently liked what he heard, writing to Gates within days to offer his 
services as an adviser�
Days later, Yarnell submitted a proposed plan of naval and military organiza-
tion that cribbed from a similar plan he had submitted to the Chinese military 
mission� Among other points, the plan advocated a unified military command 
structure under a single civilian authority, again demonstrating his belief in the 
benefit of unification�61 Meeting with Gates in May and June, Yarnell discussed 
matters of naval aviation, which most likely included how to address public 
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efforts urging creation of an independent air force�62 Perhaps spurred by Gates, 
Yarnell wrote to Vice Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO) Vice Admiral Frederick 
J� Horne about the independent air force movement� With CNO Admiral Ernest 
J� King’s concurrence, the VCNO asked whether Yarnell would be interested in 
heading a board to study the matter; Yarnell agreed�63 King wrote Yarnell a follow- 
up letter about his acceptance, in which he thanked him for his willingness to 
serve, and added, “[Y]ou can expect to be asked for advice on a large variety of 
air—and other—matters�”64
Mere days prior to receiving the invitation from Horne, Yarnell had drafted an 
article that articulated his views on unification and aviation independence that 
he had developed over his interwar career�65 Historian Clark Reynolds describes 
Yarnell’s unification article and forthcoming June 1943 investigation into naval 
aviation as having “stirred up several hornet’s nests in about three months” before 
the retired admiral “passed into obscurity�”66 Titled “A Department of War” and 
published in the August 1943 Proceedings, Yarnell’s article declares demobiliza-
tion to be one of the major domestic problems confronting the nation� He asks 
“whether or not a thorough reorganization of our military departments is essen-
tial in the interest of efficiency and economy�”67 Having witnessed America’s costs 
in blood, time, and treasure in building forces for World War I, and then ineffi-
ciencies both nationally and with Allies in waging the war, Yarnell concludes that 
organizational independence had resulted in waste�
Yarnell proposes a new U�S� Department of War for the post–World War II era� 
He avers that the current organizational construct had disadvantaged American 
military aviation and he disparages the British model of three independent armed 
services—a thinly veiled swipe at American advocates of air force independence� 
Yarnell outlines a new organization that a civilian secretary would lead, oversee-
ing a uniformed chief of staff who would oversee an Operations Division and a 
Material Division� The former would handle personnel procurement, training, 
and operations in war for the three service branches—army, navy, and air� The 
Operations Division chief also would act as commander in chief of all forces in 
time of war� The Material Division’s responsibilities would include design and 
procurement of all matériel for the armed forces� Under this proposal, all officers 
would attend a single military academy and all would receive aviation training� 
Upon graduation, officers would be assigned to one of the three uniformed 
branches� Officers for the Material Division would be drawn from leading tech-
nical colleges�
Yarnell believed his proposal would provide greater flexibility for the exchange 
of officers among branches; increase unity of command and mutual understand-
ing among branches; and commit officers in the respective divisions to a career 
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of both designing and building the weapons of war, or training for the most ef-
ficient use of said weapons in time of war� The proposal, Yarnell argued, “would 
meet the requirements of modern war through a more logical force structure,” 
thereby assuring “the most efficient use of the sums appropriated by Congress 
for our national security�”68 The article bore the hallmarks of Yarnell’s planning 
philosophy refined over the decades, perhaps most of all regarding efficiency, 
both in economic matters and in the sharing of knowledge among personnel�
In late June 1943, Yarnell reported for duty in Washington to investigate avia-
tion matters� Using a survey of active naval aviators, Yarnell’s effort examined 
both aviation issues and overall national defense organization� By coincidence, 
his survey arrived in aviators’ mailboxes at the same time that his Proceedings ar-
ticle reached wardroom tables� When summarized, the data from Yarnell’s survey 
reflected a belief that there had been a misuse of naval airpower in the war� The 
survey also revealed support for unification of the services under a single military 
secretary rather than an independent air force in direct competition with the 
Navy and War Departments�69
Admiral King did not implement all of Yarnell’s recommendations� However, 
some elements—notably the appointment of aviators to Admiral Nimitz’s staff—
proved useful in the fast-carrier task force campaigns of 1944�70
DEMOBILIZATION PLANNING
Soon after receiving the aviation assignment, Yarnell received a second tasking: 
to prepare a plan for demobilizing the Navy and reducing the size of the postwar 
force� The matter had emerged in late July when Acting Secretary of War Robert 
P� Patterson Sr� informed Knox of the War Department’s recently established 
Special Planning Division to study postwar planning�71 A week later, on August 4, 
1943, Yarnell wrote to Joseph W� Powell, special assistant to Secretary Knox� The 
letter stated that the Navy had ongoing war projects that were unnecessary, and 
by acting immediately to reduce those projects the service could save billions of 
dollars and avoid numerous postwar labor issues�72 In a testament to his analytic 
ability, Yarnell recognized that the equilibrium in the war had shifted sufficiently 
in favor of the Allies to warrant a reduction in war projects� With direct reference 
to defensive bases in the Atlantic and Alaska, Yarnell recommended an intel-
ligent reduction in demands for military manpower and war matériel both to 
save money and to ease postwar transfer of labor from the military to the civilian 
economy� Yarnell’s letter to Powell, writes historian Jeffrey G� Barlow, probably 
persuaded Horne to draft an order for a demobilization board�73 The letter argu-
ably reinforced a memo from Horne to King of August 2 in which the VNCO 
stated as follows:
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While it is not considered necessary to set up a planning board or planning division 
as such at the present time, it is considered advisable to consider seriously the detail 
of an officer of rank and experience who should give his entire thought as to what 
planning will be necessary and how it should be carried out, and for this purpose it 
is suggested that Vice Admiral [Roland M�] Brainard might be ordered to duty under 
the Vice Chief of Naval Operations as soon as he is placed on the retired list�74 
Horne tapped Yarnell to draft a proposed order for a demobilization board, 
which he submitted on August 13 for finalization within OPNAV over the com-
ing week�75
On August 26, 1943, Knox ordered Yarnell to serve under the VCNO and head 
a Navy Special Planning Section tasked with planning for postwar demobiliza-
tion� Yarnell would “prepare maximum and minimum estimates of the Post-war 
requirements for the Navy and naval establishment,” and after VNCO approval 
these would serve “as a basis for post-war demobilization planning�”76 Horne is-
sued a follow-on memo to Yarnell the next day to define the scope of the work� 
The VCNO requested the preliminary study by November 1, to include retention 
target figures for naval units (types and sizes, surface and air), the shore estab-
lishment, and personnel� Horne included some of his own ideas for Yarnell’s 
consideration, which historian Vincent Davis summarizes as wanting the biggest 
possible active and reserve fleets, with Horne requesting that Yarnell give con-
sideration to organizing task forces that “spread around[, which] appears more 
desirable than a concentrated fleet organization� Naval officers and men should 
know the world and its seas�”77
Yarnell adroitly composed his preliminary draft and submitted it to Horne 
within two weeks� In it he acknowledged some enduring policy assumptions—
maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine, avoidance of European disputes, ongoing 
interests in the Far East—then recognized that the defeat of Germany and Japan 
would leave the United States with an overabundance of military power that 
would necessitate a swift demobilization of personnel and disposal of matériel� 
Yarnell stressed maintaining a building program of certain ship types to sustain 
research and development in case of emergency; this inclusion, one presumes, 
resulted from his experiences as chief engineer of the Navy�78 After incorporat-
ing some initial feedback, Yarnell reviewed Army demobilization plans and 
consulted with senior Navy civilian and uniformed officials to refine his thinking 
further� Unlike in his previous planning experiences, Yarnell produced the report 
independently�79
Horne received Yarnell’s refined Navy demobilization plan draft on September 
22, 1943� Yarnell framed the postwar force within national policy and the mission 
of the armed forces� He concluded that both American military services (writ 
large—the Army and the Navy) had failed to fulfill their prewar missions, which 
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were as follows: to understand foreign policies and commitments; to recognize 
the increasing power of the nations disputing those policies; to recognize that 
policy and its supporting force are interdependent; and to inform the govern-
ment of their inability to support national policies, owing “to the inadequacy of 
the armed forces�” The last-listed charge stemmed from Yarnell’s own evaluation 
of the nation’s (lack of) prewar military preparedness—and arguably it was only 
his seniority and his reputation that permitted him to lay such a serious charge 
against the prewar military leadership� Yarnell listed eleven policy assumptions 
that should guide postwar Navy planning for demobilizing the wartime force� 
While identifying factors relevant to the strength of the postwar Navy, he noted 
that the United States and Great Britain, as the only two great naval powers in 
the world, might both be confronted with a long postwar period of unrest and 
instability requiring global policing by military forces�80
The plan reflected Horne’s desire to maintain a large postwar Navy� Yarnell 
included as one of his relevant factors that “the first estimate of the naval forces to 
be kept in commission should be too large rather than too small�” In his analysis 
of the plan, historian Vincent Davis observes how Yarnell “tacitly assumed that 
the American people would be willing to support a large peacetime military es-
tablishment” and alluded to compulsory military training and a unified military 
establishment�81 Drawing additional cues from Horne’s August 27 memo, Yarnell 
recommended assigning naval forces to eight geographic stations, with a post-
war surface navy organized into three task forces, each composed of three large 
aircraft carriers and two battleships, with supporting cruisers, destroyers, and 
auxiliaries� Three reserve task forces mirroring the “fully manned” task forces 
would train reservists, while each of the six geographic stations (not including 
the East or West Coast of the United States) would sustain a squadron of four 
cruisers, twelve destroyers or destroyer escorts, two carriers, and supporting aux-
iliaries� Plans for actual demobilization would be drafted by OPNAV to address 
the postwar surface forces, the disposition of Navy shore facilities, and the status 
of naval aviation� The Marine Corps, Navy bureaus, and assorted offices would 
draft their own demobilization plans�82 The geographic scope of Yarnell’s plan 
vastly expanded the historical stationing of USN forces abroad� This plan would 
pair perfectly with future plans for the United Nations and President Roosevelt’s 
vision of the United States as one of the world’s “Four Policemen�”83
Yarnell’s preliminary plan provided the framework for Navy Basic Demobi-
lization Plan No� 1� Yarnell submitted a revised plan to Horne on October 28� 
The revision incorporated feedback from colleagues and affirmation from King 
that the plan was “based on acceptable assumptions and that sound conclusions 
are reached�”84 Yarnell added a new postwar policy assumption of “support of 
an adequate Merchant Marine and commercial aviation as factors in our future 
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security�” Regarding postwar armed strength, Yarnell included a new statement 
for expeditionary warfare in future American conflicts, whereby “the armed 
forces should be designed and trained to carry on a war of aggression in enemy 
territory�” He added a lengthy paragraph recommending an immediate study on 
the elimination of certain types of vessels not needed for the Pacific War and to 
eliminate all construction unessential for the successful prosecution of the war� 
Reassessing the target strength of the postwar Navy, Yarnell included a statement 
that Great Britain “will be a strong commercial rival with the remote possibility 
of becoming a future enemy”—perhaps an optimistic appraisal derived from his 
World War I experience� He also altered his assumption on the future of Russia, 
to include a growth in its naval forces� Yarnell delineated the number of aircraft 
squadrons for the previously listed geographic stations and changed the desig-
nation from “task forces” to “numbered fleets�” Lastly, he added an additional 
amphibious force composed of a reinforced regiment of Marines and required 
transports�85 Although still only a draft, Yarnell’s plan outlined a substantial 
postwar role for the Navy, matching a large force to domestic and international 
commitments that were unprecedented in the service’s history�
Formally released on November 17, 1943, Navy Basic Demobilization Plan 
No� 1 retained most of Yarnell’s refined draft� Horne and his staff made some 
changes to Yarnell’s work, with slight numerical edits to the size and scope of 
the problem and rewording of assumptions about Great Britain and Russia as 
potential adversaries� Horne’s staff dropped Yarnell’s national policy commitment 
for compulsory military training� Instead, Navy Basic Demobilization Plan No� 1 
stated that “[d]efense of our national interests must envisage the desirability of 
being able to commence offensive operations without waiting for an initial as-
sault and setback by any future enemy� A well trained Navy composed of vessels, 
aircraft, and amphibious units, ready for immediate use will be essential to that 
end�” The three numbered fleets each received an additional battleship and two 
repair ships, but otherwise the proposed postwar Navy size tracked with Yarnell’s 
draft�86 Issued under Horne’s signature, Plan No� 1 was, according to Vincent 
Davis, ultimately less a plan for demobilization than “a statement of assumptions 
and principles intended to guide the various offices of the Navy Department in 
their participation in the planning of the postwar Navy�”87
A week after Horne released Plan No� 1, Yarnell shared his reflections on 
the existing planning process in a letter to the VCNO� To ease the task at hand, 
Yarnell recommended that Horne acquire a “small able ‘Plans Division’ to give 
you considered opinions on many of the problems that come across your desk�” 
Making a brief reference to his experience with OPNAV in September 1918, 
Yarnell suggested that the associated personnel include “a Rear Admiral (Active 
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List) in charge and not more than three or four younger officers, Captains or 
Commanders� They should be high grade officers who have served their time at 
sea and are due for 2 or 3 years shore duty� They should have no administrative 
duty.” Creating such a plans division would provide the VNCO with “reasoned 
opinions quickly on many questions which you now have to work out yourself�”88
While the letter bore Yarnell’s signature, it easily could have been the specter 
of Sims guiding his protégé’s hand across the page, writing the same request to 
Benson� The tone of Yarnell’s letter shows awareness that he alone could not 
keep pace with the immensity of events, and that a younger, core team of officers 
would equip the VCNO better for postwar planning matters� Yet despite this 
awareness, Yarnell essentially remained Horne’s Special Planning Section all by 
himself�
Yarnell worked on Navy Basic Demobilization Plan No� 2 from November 
1943 to February 1944� While Plan No� 1 assumed the Allied nations would reach 
no agreement to maintain peace in the postwar era, Plan No� 2 assumed the Unit-
ed States and Great Britain would divide control of the sea and air in accordance 
with present strategic areas—a reflection of the growing assumption within the 
Navy Department that Anglo-American naval cooperation would continue after 
the war was over� Plan No� 2 also assumed continuation of President Roosevelt’s 
Good Neighbor Policy, with air or naval actions undertaken in conjunction with 
the nations of Central and South America� The Soviet Union would police the 
waters adjacent to its territory in the northwest Pacific, China would have a navy 
adequate to police its rivers and coastal waters, and Japan would be permitted a 
coast guard capable of policing local waters and maintaining lighthouse service� 
In the Pacific, new assumptions included retaining the Marshall, Caroline, Mari-
ana, Pelew, and Bonin Islands, with air and naval bases on the former three and 
air bases on the latter two�89 The plan rested on a fundamental assumption that 
after the war the Allied powers would cooperate in maintaining the peace and in 
making and abiding by agreements for commercial and military air bases, togeth-
er with reciprocal agreements for the use of foreign naval and military air bases�
The drawdown of the Navy, in both uniformed personnel and civilian work-
ers, would be conducted gradually� Economic considerations were essential in 
the disposal of obsolete weaponry and the retention of naval stores on the basis 
of sound economy in government� Yarnell included a recommendation for the 
Army and Navy to organize a research effort, codified in legislation, to continue 
developing new weapons and armaments� In other areas Plan No� 2 essentially 
mirrored its predecessor�90
Overall, Yarnell’s plan aimed at maintaining a naval establishment capable 
of policing the far reaches of the globe and of expanding further efficiently, if 
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necessary� It would keep an eye toward developing future tactics, techniques, and 
technologies for naval warfare on, above, and below the oceans�
Yarnell concluded his planning work in June 1944� Horne had forwarded the 
revised Plan No� 1 with its subsidiary office and bureau plans to the new Secretary 
of the Navy, James V� Forrestal, on May 22�91 Following this, on June 9, Horne 
sent Yarnell’s Plan No� 2 to the bureaus and offices for review, and concurrently 
requested that Yarnell prepare Navy Basic Demobilization Plan No� 3� This third 
iteration incorporated the premise that peace and security would be guaranteed 
by an international organization under an international agreement, dominated 
by the United States, Great Britain, Russia, and China� Further premises in-
cluded that other nations would contribute to or join the organization, with the 
Americans, British, Russians, and Chinese responsible for the sea and air in their 
respective strategic areas, and that the world organization’s total power would be 
capable of ensuring peace against any probable aggressor—including one of the 
four dominant powers�92
In three days, Yarnell replied with a prescient memorandum forecasting the 
postwar world� He first listed three factors requiring study before a demobiliza-
tion plan could be crafted: the general world conditions in the immediate post-
war era; postwar armed strength among the leading Allied nations, their future 
policies, and the probability that one of them would become an aggressor; and 
the likely character of the international organization that would be agreed on�93 
Yarnell envisioned an immediate postwar world filled with nation-state tension, 
unrest, and civil and minor wars� Domestically, dominant issues would be demo-
bilizing war workers and servicemembers, disposing of war matériel, practicing 
economy in government expenditure, and finding a solution to racial problems� 
In Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, Yarnell foresaw difficulties, with conflicts 
among nations, probable violence between Jews and Arabs in Palestine, and dif-
ferences between Russia and Turkey over the Bosporus and Dardanelles� The 
burden for addressing these conflicts would fall on Great Britain and Russia, 
with America’s participation limited to withdrawal of its combat forces, provision 
of humanitarian and reconstruction aid, and protection of American nationals 
and other interests� The Far East also faced uncertainty over the stability of the 
Chinese government, France and Great Britain resuming control of their colo-
nial possessions, and the Philippines gaining independence� “Due to the growth 
of nationalist feeling,” Yarnell accurately predicted, “there will be unrest and 
disturbances in the colonial areas,” perhaps recognizing that neither the French 
nor British would resume control with ease� Yarnell projected the United States, 
emerging as the preeminent military power on the sea and with strong air and 
ground forces, would maintain its prewar policies of the Open Door in Asia, the 
Monroe Doctrine, and promotion of international trade, with the addition of a 
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willingness to enter into an international organization for peace, and obtaining a 
share of sea and air transportation�94
Yarnell then proceeded to examine the three other dominant powers� First, 
with Great Britain’s power having been on the decline since the Boer War of 
1899–1902, Yarnell deemed the country unlikely to become an aggressor and 
advocated maintaining friendly relations�
Second, Russia possessed great potential for power� Yarnell wrote that Rus-
sian leaders’ shared “realistic and nationalistic” policy, developed with their own 
security in mind, was a policy that the United States “must be prepared for � � � in 
the post-war settlements�” He foretold the country’s insistence on taking Latvia, 
Lithuania, Estonia, Bessarabia, and parts of Poland and Finland, as well as on 
projecting its claims in the Pacific to southern Sakhalin Island and the Kurils� 
Yarnell argued that the United States should not object to these actions, nor 
to possible demands for neutralizing the Kiel Canal and the Dardanelles, as he 
considered these Russian policy initiatives to be born of understandable security 
imperatives� Claiming that “[t]here are no major clashes of policy between the 
United States and Russia,” Yarnell opined that “with realistic statesmanship on 
both sides, there is no danger at present or in the visible future of a major clash 
between nations�” As Russia had no sea power, Yarnell deemed that it could not 
be considered a serious threat for twenty or thirty years—a conclusion at odds 
with that of Forrestal and the Office of Naval Intelligence by the fall of 1944�95
The challenge that the third power, China, continued to face was maintaining 
a stable government in power during and after the war� Despite his knowledge of 
the senior levels of the Nationalist Chinese government, Yarnell curiously wrote 
that, beyond the nation reverting to chaos and civil war, there was nothing to 
replace the current government should it collapse; astonishingly, the Communist 
Chinese did not elicit a mention� Even with a stable government, reconstruction 
of the nation would occupy its energy, and without sea power China could not 
be considered a threat�96
Yarnell affirmed that an international organization would not change, to 
any appreciable degree, the amount of American naval strength that Plan No� 2 
deemed necessary to be kept in commission, and therefore he recommended that 
the figures for forces and outlying bases in Plan No� 2 be accepted in relation to 
Horne’s June 9 memorandum�97 By essentially cutting the knees out from under 
his own Plan No� 3, Yarnell left Horne with a useful conceptual document, but 
ensured that it was Plan No� 2 that would receive further development in the 
future�98
Yarnell’s memorandum to Horne is a fascinating document� His global 
socioeconomic-political forecast proved mostly accurate, although it was perhaps 
overly optimistic regarding the other dominant powers� The retired admiral 
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broke new ground for Navy planners in attempting to examine the post–World 
War II world, thanks to the intellectual template provided by his work in London 
and OPNAV from 1918 to 1920� Yarnell’s predictions about developing an in-
ternational order centered on the four dominant powers—reflecting Roosevelt’s 
“Four Policemen”—and the policy issues they would confront proved rather pre-
scient, at least when considering the United Nations Security Council�
On the other hand, Yarnell’s faith that Great Britain would maintain sufficient 
military strength to police Germany and address other European problems, 
along with Russia, proved unfounded� Yarnell completely misread the potential 
of the Soviet and Chinese Communists to develop into formidable adversaries 
by decade’s end� The omission of the Com-
munist movement in China and the belief that 
the United States would limit its involvement in 
European affairs were extremely odd oversights 
for someone of Yarnell’s experience in both re-
gions� Furthermore, while he was aware of the 
growing capability of aviation, as particularly 
evidenced by bomber operations in Europe, 
his overriding assumption that only sea power 
could threaten the United States was obsolete�99 
Notably, neither Yarnell nor Horne was privy to 
a highly classified project that only King and a 
few other Navy personnel knew existed, code-
named Manhattan�100
With his submission of Plan No� 3, Yarnell 
essentially concluded his work� He continued to 
provide additional memorandums and insight 
to senior officials over the course of the summer and into the fall; for all intents 
and purposes, however, responsibility for postwar planning thereafter resided 
with the staffs of Horne and King—Yarnell acknowledged that the demobiliza-
tion problem “is not in my hands any longer�”101 On November 24, 1944, Yarnell 
received orders returning him to inactive duty as of January 15, 1945�102 The day 
after Christmas, the Navy Department announced his third retirement�103 King 
thanked Yarnell for having “worked with devotion and distinction in the Office of 
the Chief of Naval Operations� His departure carried with it my personal regret at 
the loss of his services and my thanks for a job well done�”104 Ironically, comments 
historian Jeffrey Barlow, the press release was sent out the same day that King’s 
planners issued their study on the postwar world�105
Yarnell returned to Newport� He told a friend that he had “a lot of painting and 
carpenter work to do around the house�”106
Admiral Harry E. Yarnell, fully retired and at his desk in his home in 
Newport, Rhode Island, February 2, 1945.
Author’s collection
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REFLECTION AND PERSPECTIVE
With his planning experiences of 1918–20 and 1943–44, Admiral Harry E� 
Yarnell provided the Navy with continuity, personnel-wise, between the world 
wars� His training at the Naval War College and his work with “the ablest men” 
of Admiral Sims’s Planning Section instilled and reinforced in Yarnell ideas and 
methodologies that he applied throughout his career, especially at critical junc-
tures of the Navy’s evolution and force development� Most notable among these 
were the necessity for policy relations between and among the State, Navy, and 
War Departments; unification and unity of command; economy of force; and 
the applicatory system� While during World War II he perforce conducted his 
planning efforts without the contributions of a small section of talented minds 
working in unison, in contrast to the previous war, his half century of service 
and study of military history equipped him admirably for the task� He embraced 
emerging technologies and grasped political developments to formulate plans 
that provided the Navy leadership with sound foundations for further discussion 
and refinement� While Yarnell was—and continues to be—unheralded for his 
strategic vision, his fingerprints can be found all over both the interwar Navy and 
the force that entered the Cold War era�
If Yarnell represented one of the last beneficiaries of Sims’s leadership and 
legacy, he in turn provided that legacy to the Cold War U�S� Navy�107 In one of his 
final memorandums to Horne, in mid-December 1944, Yarnell wrote about the 
German V-1 and V-2 weapons� He explained that “the introduction of these mis-
siles as an operational weapon marks a turning point in the methods of waging 
war� In the near future, even before the end of the present war, controlled missiles 
and high speed robot aircraft undoubtedly will become a prime factor in the suc-
cess of naval warfare, and in the safety of our country�”108
Like Sims, Yarnell kept an eye out for promising young minds, and found 
one in a young reserve lieutenant and budding strategist� In January 1945, the 
lieutenant wrote to the thrice-retired admiral, thanking him “for the fact that 
my Navy service has been as interesting and as useful as it has in fact proved�” 
He then added, “I am especially grateful to you for the arrangement whereby 
you made it possible for me to work in a section where I felt I was more useful 
to the war effort than that in which I had previously been�”109 Writing in 1946 
about the implications of the atomic bomb, Yarnell’s former lieutenant grappled 
with military history’s role in formulating strategy� He concluded that “[h]istory 
is at best an imperfect guide to the future, but when imperfectly understood 
and interpreted it is a menace to sound judgement�”110 Presumably Yarnell 
would have agreed with this conclusion by the author, his former lieutenant: 
Bernard Brodie�
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